Friday, November 20, 2026

SJ182 - Tragedy leads to new Airworthiness Directive

The FAA has opened an Airworthiness Directive (AD) for comments relating to checking the spoiler input to the autothrottle on 737 NG airplane models.  It is believed that this input malfunctioned on a 737-500 airplane that prevented the Cruise Thrust Split Monitor from disconnecting the autothrottle, which would likely have prevented the accident over five years ago.  The AD compels compliance to a Boeing Safety Advisory.

On 9 January 2021, a Boeing 737-500 aircraft, registration PK-CLC, was on a scheduled domestic flight, from Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (WIII), Jakarta, to Supadio International Airport (WIOO), Pontianak. PT Sriwijaya Air flight SJ182 crashed into the sea about five minutes later, with all 62 lives lost in the tragedy. Weather conditions for the mid-afternoon flight were not considered a factor. 

I analyzed the accident and wrote a post on satcom.guru. Initially it was apparent that the airplane had rolled into a dive. The investigation revealed a massive throttle split that led to loss of control. There were a number of aspects in the sequence to the tragedy, both leading up to the loss of control and the 23 seconds that led to the catastrophe and loss of all onboard.


*************Air Crash Investigation****************

Air Crash Investigation took note of my work and asked me to be a part of an episode dedicated to the accident. I have been on many television shows, mostly news oriented. I have been a fan of "Mayday" as it was first known originally and as they have continued, today in their 25th season. I encourage anyone interested in aviation safety and crass investigation to watch the series. I was thrilled with the opportunity. I had a chance to offer advice on the technical aspects and of course contribute commentary to the show itself. My first "starring" role!

I can attest to the massive work that goes into each episode and the care and attention to detail that is applied. Sure, they have some production limits in their recreations, but they make no compromise in following the final report and the advice from the actual investigators. A funny issue cropped up when referring to the "thrust levers" which I typically refer to as throttles. I was an autothrottle engineer. For the recording, on several occasions, we had to repeat filming because I used "throttle". 

*****************************************************


While it took years to produce and release the episode (which was done first outside of the US and then here), the FAA has only just recently taken formal action based on one of the major findings.

In the case of SJ182, the autothrottle did not disconnect as expected when the throttle split resulted in a corresponding roll command to offset the asymmetric thrust in yaw which creates a rolling moment (swept wing artifact). 

From the KNKT accident report:

The Cruise Thrust Split Monitor (CTSM) disengages the A/T when A/P roll control requires significant spoiler deployment and a disparity of calculated thrust (in A/T computer) of both engines when at the same time, normally the thrust levers become separated. The CTSM is active when flaps are less than 12.5°, and the A/T is not engaged in the takeoff or go-around mode.

On 16 November 2000, the FAA issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) number FAA AD 2000-23-34 to replace the existing A/T computer with a new P/N. The FAA AD refers to the Boeing Service Bulletin number SB 737-22A1130 dated 24 September 1998.

The AD was applicable to all Boeing Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes was effective from 8 January 2001. The AD referred to Boeing Alert Service Bulletin number 737-22A1130 which required replacement of the previous A/T computer with improved A/T computer Boeing P/N 10-62017-30 or 10-62017-31.

The AD addressed the problem of split thrust lever movement caused by irregular A/T operation which results in asymmetric thrust conditions causing the airplane to bank excessively and going into a roll. 

 CTSM was installed on this airplane. CTSM should have caused the autothrottle to disconnect.

The FDR recorded at 07:39:40 UTC, the control wheels deflected to the right about 19°, the left aileron deflection down 3.3° and the right aileron deflected up 5.8°, the calculated spoiler deflection was 3.7°, and the aircraft roll angle was 15° to the right. Based on the CTSM design, the A/T should have been disengaged at this time as all requirements were met. 

The autothrottle did not disconnect at 07:39:40, but much later at 07:40:10. Had the autothrottle disconnected as designed, the autopilot would have still had remaining right rolling moment authority and control would not have been lost.

The investigation concluded that the spoiler position sensor that was used in the CTSM monitor was mis-rigged. At the point that the autothrottle disconnected, which was presumably by CTSM command, the spoiler sensor position was much higher than what should have been needed to trip the monitor.

The FDR did not record A/T manual disconnection at the time of the A/T disengaged, meaning that the disengage button on either thrust lever was not used by the crew to disengage the system. While it is possible for the A/T to be manually disengaged using a switch on the MCP, this would not be an expected technique during an upset recovery event. In addition, during the accident flight the thrust levers were not manually moved until 9 seconds after the A/T disengaged. It would seem unlikely that the crew would disengage the A/T manually but then waited 9 seconds to move the thrust levers. 

The FAA has opened up an Airworthiness Directive FAA-2026-13812 for comment on this subject.

Link to AD Docket The docket has both the AD and also the Boeing Safety Advisory


The FAA Airworthiness Directive states the following

(e) Unsafe Condition

This AD was prompted by a review of the autothrottle (A/T) cruise thrust split monitor (MONFD) and the determination that there is a potential for latent loss of spoiler sensor position data or erroneous spoiler sensor position data. The FAA is issuing this AD to address latent loss of spoiler sensor position data or erroneous spoiler sensor position data. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could lead to failure of the A/T MONFD to activate, which could result in a significant throttle split leading to asymmetric thrust and the subsequent lack of autothrottle disengagement that could lead to an uncommanded roll. An uncommanded roll that is not detected and corrected by the flight crew in a timely manner could result in potential loss of control of the airplane and loss of continued safe flight and landing.

The issue is created because the autothrottle has no built-in test to recognize that the spoiler input, used to trigger the autothrottle disconnect, is not working correctly. 

The safety advisory requires that operators conduct a specific test to check for the correct spoiler input to the autothrottle. The test must be done within 250 hours or two months from the issuance date (October 30, 2026) and then repeat the test every 750 hours or six months. Boeing calculates these time windows based on failure mode analysis. 

The problem was well known with the issuance of the final accident report Nov 10, 2022. 


While the delay in taking action is 4+ years is discouraging, and while the action requested was obvious in the course of the investigation, it is encouraging to see the action is finally taken. Aviation learns from its mistakes.

What is interesting is that the applicability does not include 737-500, the very model that crashed. None of the "Classic" models are included. 

I count about 12 737-500 aircraft operating today (per Flightradar 24).


One is US registered.


While so many things could have prevented the SJ182 tragedy, it is good to know that eventually action has been taken to ensure it should never happen again.


Peter Lemme

 

peter @ satcom.guru

Copyright 2026 satcom.guru All Rights Reserved

 

Peter Lemme has been a leader in avionics engineering for 45 years. He is the thought leader to the Seamless Air Alliance. He offers independent consulting services largely focused on avionics and L, Ku, and Ka band satellite communications. Peter chaired the SAE-ITC AEEC Ku/Ka-band satcom subcommittee for more than ten years, developing ARINC 791 parts 1, 2, and 3; ARINC 792, Project Paper 793, Project Paper 790, and continues as a member. He also contributes to the Network Infrastructure and Cybersecurity (NISC) subcommittee and the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) subcommittee. Peter was awarded the Volare Pioneer Award by AEEC/SAE-ITC for Data Link and Satellite Communications in 2025. Peter was chairman of RTCA SC165 working group 5, satellite voice.

 

Peter was Boeing avionics supervisor for 767 and 747-400 data link recording, data link reporting, and satellite communications. He was an FAA designated engineering representative (DER) for ACARS, satellite communications, DFDAU, DFDR, ACMS and printers. Peter was lead engineer for Thrust Management System (757, 767, 747-400), supervisor for satellite communications for 777, and was manager of terminal-area projects (GLS, MLS, enhanced vision) across all Boeing commercial airplanes.


An instrument-rated private pilot, single engine land and sea, Peter has enjoyed perspectives from both operating and designing airplanes. Hundreds of hours of flight test analysis and thousands of hours in simulators have given him an appreciation for the many aspects that drive aviation; whether tandem complexity, policy, human, or technical; and the difficulties and challenges to achieving success. 

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